A worldview that affirms inherent human value based on the belief in human dignity and moral worth significantly shapes perspectives on bioethical issues, including abortion, designer babies, and stem cell research. This worldview upholds that all human life, from conception to natural death, possesses intrinsic value and should be respected regardless of developmental stage, physical ability, or genetic composition. As such, abortion is viewed through a moral lens that emphasizes the protection of vulnerable life, prioritizing the rights of the unborn as persons with dignity. This perspective often leads to ethical objections against elective termination, especially when alternatives such as adoption or social support systems are available to address maternal health concerns (Sulmasy et al., 2021).
Similarly, the manipulation of embryos in the context of designer babies raises significant moral concerns. A human value-centered worldview perceives genetic enhancement for non-therapeutic reasons as ethically problematic, suggesting it commodifies life and undermines the acceptance of natural human diversity. It challenges the notion of selecting traits based on parental preference, as this may prioritize societal ideals over individual worth and dignity. Stem cell research, particularly when involving embryonic stem cells, also encounters ethical resistance from this worldview. Since it involves the destruction of embryos, the practice is often seen as incompatible with the respect owed to nascent human life. This does not, however, preclude support for ethical alternatives such as adult stem cell research or induced pluripotent stem cells, which align scientific progress with respect for life (Ravitsky et al., 2020).
References
Ravitsky, V., Birko, S., Dupras-Leduc, R., & MacKay, J. (2020). Epistemic and ethical challenges in the clinical translation of stem cell research. Accountability in Research, 27(5), 265–283. https://doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2020.1769840
Sulmasy, D. P., Horwitz, R. I., & Singer, P. A. (2021). Value pluralism and critical bioethics. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 42(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-021-09537-z